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Abstract
Economic development at both the domestic and global levels is associated with increasing tensions which are
inextricably linked to the meaning and allocation of  property rights, which has a great impact on
appropriation of  resources and may lead to different paths of  development. ‘Taking’ – the appropriation
of  private land for public needs – is a typical example that exhibits those tensions, posing a challenge to the
conventional conception of  property as individualistic and exclusive rights of  possession, use and disposition
and to the associated neoliberal model of  development. Should the individual landowner be left to bear the
cost of  a regulatory intervention which endures to the wider benefit of  the whole community? How can the
tensions between private ownership and public regulation be mitigated? If  we take the liberal concept of
property, then private property seems to be in constant conflict with public interests and wider social concerns.
Meanwhile, community, situating between the state and the individuals, and community’s relationship to
development rights have not provoked enough discussion. The paper explores the different ways land
development rights might be seen both in Western, essentially common law, systems and in China, especially
now and in view of  two case studies. An empirical example in Wugang, China, reveals the importance of
integrating the ‘community lens’ proposed by Roger Cotterrell into studies of  the transfer of  land
development rights. Reading through the community lens, taking could be giving and appropriation could
also be access. This approach provides a new perspective to re-evaluate the relationship between legal
appropriation and development.
Introduction
Economic development at both the domestic and global levels is associated withincreasing tensions including those between the urban and the rural, efficiency and
equity, private ownership and public regulation, the rights of  individuals and of
communities, and the North and the South. Those tensions are inextricably linked to the
meaning and allocation of  property rights, which has a great impact on appropriation of
resources and may lead to different paths of  development. ‘Taking’ – the appropriation of
private land for public needs – is a typical example that exhibits those tensions, posing a
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challenge to the conventional conception of  property as individualistic and exclusive rights
of  possession, use and disposition and to the associated neoliberal model of  development.1
This article seeks to answer two closely related questions: should the individual
landowner be left to bear the cost of  a regulatory intervention which endures to the wider
benefit of  the whole community? How can the tensions between private ownership and
public regulation be mitigated?
The article starts with a discussion of  the challenges posed by economic development
to the liberal/neoliberal conception of  property. It then reviews the evolution of  land
development rights in Western, essentially common law systems, and in China, especially
now and in view of  two case studies.
Land development rights can be defined as ‘the right to change the use of  a parcel of
land from one yielding a lower return [agricultural use] to a use yielding a higher return
[urban residential, commercial, or industrial use], with consequent increase in its value’.2
While recognising the importance of  development rights in takings of  land, practices in the
US and UK have been largely confined to the liberal framework. By contrast, two case
studies of  China’s recent developments in the transfer of  land development rights3 provide
an alternative way of  re-evaluating the two questions raised above. Empirical examples
focus on the practices in Wugang and Chongqing in China, two pilot cities chosen by the
Chinese government to experiment with the transfer of  land development rights. Albeit
with many limits, transfers of  development rights in the these two cities have opened up
possibilities of  integrating local people, who are often excluded and sometimes exploited in
land development, into the process of  appropriation and allocation of  land resources.
Compared to US practice, Wugang’s experiments highlight the importance of  integrating
the community lens proposed by Roger Cotterrell4 into studies of  the transfer of  land
development rights.
As an old social science concept, there are many interpretations of  what community is
or should be. Roger Cotterrell sees ‘community’ as networks of  social relations held
together by a variety of  bonds (e.g. a convergence of  economic interests, shared custom,
common values) and based on mutual interpersonal trust.5 Drawing on Weber’s four types
of  social action (traditional, affectual, instrumentally rational and value-rational),6
Cotterrell’s ‘networks of  relations of  community’ encompass four ideal types of
community: instrumental community, traditional community, community of  belief  and
affective community. Cotterrell stresses the relations between law and community (rather
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1 This model of  development is often characterised by outright privatisation. 
2 D Monson and A Monson, ‘Development and Practice of  British Planning Law’ (1949–1950) 44 Illinois Law
Review 779, 785.
3 The transfer of  development rights is not limited to transfers of  land rights, but is widely discussed in the
context of  climate change, the greenhouse effect and air pollution. The Kyoto Protocol in 1997, for example,
has established a framework of  trading in quotas or emission credits for carbon emission. Similar examples
include tradable fishing quotas and transferable air-pollution permits. See e.g. C M Rose, ‘Expanding the
Choices for the Global Commons: Comparing Newfangled Tradable Allowance Schemes to Old-Fashioned
Common Property Regimes’ (1999) 10 Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum 45. 
4 See e.g. R Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of  Social Theory (Ashgate 2006) 65–78;
‘Community as a Legal Concept? Some Uses of  a Law-and-Community Approach in Legal Theory’, in
R Cotterrell, Living Law: Studies in Legal and Society Theory (Ashgate 2008) 17–28. 
5 Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society (n 4). 
6 M Weber, Economy and Society: An Outline of  Interpretive Sociology, E Fischoff  (trans) (University of  California
Press 1978) 23–26. 
than an abstract ‘society’)7 and the roles of  law in expressing and strengthening the trust
that binds different actors in relations of  community. Different relations of  community
pose different regulatory problems.8 Therefore successful regulation often depends on
whether law could act as a communal resource, strengthening trust and co-operation within
networks of  relations of  community.9 This method contrasts the liberal/neoliberal
approach to disembed law from wider social life and provides ‘a sociological analysis of  the
role of  law in economic life’.10 Furthermore, such a communal approach to appropriation
and development goes beyond many ‘boundaries’ entrenched in property law11 including
the public–private divide. This approach may help to resolve C B Macpherson’s famous
tensions between property as a right to exclude and property as a right of  access.12 Reading
through the community lens, taking could be giving and appropriation could also be access.
Liberal property regime: a recipe for economic development?
The most-cited classical liberal concept of  private property is William Blackstone’s
definition of  property as ‘the sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and
exercises over the external things of  the world, in total exclusion of  the right of  any other
individual in the universe’.13 Such a perception of  property as ‘exclusive rights of
possession, use, and disposition’ has been strengthened by the economic analysis of  law,
which argues that property rights must be ‘strong and clear’ in order to preserve a well-
functioning market and thereby promote economic growth.14 This proposition remains
influential in theoretical analysis15 and has profound appeal to many development projects
promoted by the World Bank and International Monetary Fund.16 This conception of
property points to a single development path, which is expected to be followed by all
developing countries. However, many development paths have challenged the neoliberal
assertion that property rights must be strong and clear. China’s economic growth, for
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7 In this approach, ‘society is disintegrating into many different networks of  social relations in and beyond
nation states’. Cotterell, Law, Culture and Society (n 4) 65. 
8 For discussion of  the strengths and weaknesses of  each type of  community and its relation to law, see e.g.
Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society (n 4) 73–5, 154–58; Cotterrell, ‘Community as a Legal Concept?’ (n 4) 22–25. 
9 See A Perry-Kessaris, Global Business, Local Law: The Indian Legal System as a Communal Resource in Foreign
Investment Relations (Ashgate 2008); A Perry-Kessaris, ‘Reading the Story of  Law and Embeddedness through
a Community Lens: A Polanyi-Meets-Cotterrell Economic Sociology of  Law?’ (2011) 62(3) Northern Ireland
Legal Quarterly 401. See also T Xu, ‘Global Legal Transplants through the Lens of  Community: Lessons for
and from Chinese Property Law’ in A Perry-Kessaris (ed), Socio-Legal Approaches to International Economic Law:
Text, Context and Subtext (Routledge, 2012) 167–80. 
10 See R Swedberg, ‘The Case for an Economic Sociology of  Law’ (2003) 32 Theory and Society 1, 1. See also
R Cotterrell, ‘Rethinking “Embeddedness”: Law, Economy, Community’ (2013) 40(1) Journal of  Law and
Society 49, 49.
11 For more discussion, see e.g. M Heller, ‘The Boundaries of  Private Property’ (1999) 108 Yale Law Journal 1163. 
12 C B Macpherson, ‘Capitalism and the Changing Concept of  Property’ in E Kamenka and R S Neale (eds),
Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond (Edward Arnold 1975) 105–24.
13 W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of  England, vol I: Of  the Rights of  Persons (Clarendon Press 1766) 2. 
14 Ronald Coase is most cited for this proposition: see e.g. ‘The Problem of  Social Cost’ (1960) 3 Journal of  Law
and Economics 1.
15 See e.g. R Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of  Eminent Domain. (Harvard University Press 1985); 
H De Soto, The Mystery of  Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else (Black Swan
2001); T Bethell, The Noblest Triumph: Property and Prosperity through the Ages (St Martin’s Press 1998). 
16 For criticism on this approach, see e.g. D Kennedy, ‘Some Caution about Property Rights as a Recipe for
Economic Development’ (2011) 1(1) Accounting, Economics, and Law 1 <www.bepress.com/ael/
vol11/iss1/3>; R Dyal-Chand, ‘Exporting the Ownership Society: A Case Study on the Economic Impact of
Property Rights’ (2007) 39 Rutgers Law Journal 59; M Heller, The Gridlock Economy: How Too Much Ownership
Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives (Basic Books 2010). 
example, provides a counter-example that China’s growth rate is high, while private property
rights remain weak and vague. Furthermore, the liberal conception of  property enshrines
‘efficiency’ but largely ignores ‘equity’ in the use and allocation of  property rights. In doing
so, it overlooks the question of  who wins and loses in the process of  appropriation and
development and the necessity of  looking for alternative property regimes and paths of
development. Seen from the liberal perspective, any legislative restriction on one of  the
‘exclusive rights’ is, prima facie, a taking,17 including most forms of  land acquisition for
public needs such as zoning restrictions and eminent domain (also known as
condemnation).18 Indeed, taking often involves ‘the conflict between private and public
interests in the use of  a piece of  land’.19 From the liberal point of  view, such conflicts are
irresolvable because appropriation of  land for public needs, usually accompanied by
government regulation, restricts appropriation of  land resources by the individuals. A
boundary between the public and the private is entrenched and is hard to cross.
Nevertheless, taking seems unavoidable in economic development in which land needs
to be assembled for development projects. As the result of  takings often involves economic
loss of  private parties,20 compensation is one of  the core issues in taking. For example, in
the US, the private parties’ entitlement to compensation depends on whether the taking is
eminent domain, which is the process through which a government condemns a resource for
a public use and compensation to private parties is required. Indeed, the idea that eminent
domain should be coupled with compensation at ‘fair market value’ has been entrenched in
the US Constitution.21 If  a taking is for ‘public use’ and if  the owner is paid fair market value,
the taking is justified. Yet, ‘by implicitly understanding all property to be fungible’ and ‘fully
interchangeable with money’, the liberal conception of  property acquiesces in the broad
power of  eminent domain.22 So, the liberal concept of  property leads itself  to a paradox that
it ironically justifies takings and leaves the eminent domain power uncontrolled.23
Furthermore, eminent domain is embedded in a particular constitutional framework with
which the US saddled itself  in a pre-development era and may not be an effective mechanism
to deal with new taking issues in recent economic development.
Indeed, it is often neglected that ‘the ownership of  property, in and of  itself, is of  little
value to an individual. Instead, it is the owner’s ability to put that property to a particular
use that creates value in property’.24 So, how should profits generated from the increase in
land value due to development and change in use be distributed? Should ownership of  land
include a right to the development value (usually in the form of  capital gain) that results
from urban growth? Should the grant of  compensation consider the fact that the owner
may have developed a personal connection to the land25 (this may also involve communal
interest to that land)?
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17 M J Radin, Reinterpreting Property (Chicago University Press 1993) 122. 
18 Eminent domain refers to ‘the power of  any government body to compel a private owner to sell at a price
fixed by a court. When government pays for property it is free of  the constraint of  the taking issue’: see 
R H Platt, Land Use and Society: Geography, Law, and Public Policy (Island Press 2004) 278. 
19 D Krueckeberg, ‘The Difficult Character of  Property: To Whom do Things Belong?’ (1995) 61 Journal of  the
American Planning Association 301, 304.
20 J L Sax, ‘Takings, Private Property and Public Rights’ (1971) 81(2) Yale Law Journal 149, pp.150–151.
21 US Constitution: ‘Nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation’ (the last
clause of  the Fifth amendment). 
22 Radin (n 17) 136, 156. 
23 Ibid 135–37. 
24 J Stinson, ‘Transferring Development Rights: Purpose, Problems, and Prospects in New York’ (1996) 17(1)
Pace Law Review 319, 322.
25 Radin (n 17) 142. 
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Taking as giving: the evolution and transfer of land development rights
Neoliberalists assume that the market does the whole job of  allocation of  resources.
However, in contemporary society the state is ‘doing more and more of  the work of
allocation’26 in the form of  regulation through which public rights are being increasingly
inserted into private property. This has paved the way for the evolution and recognition of
land development rights. For example, in the UK,27 takings of  private land for public use
(in particular, the acquisition of  land for development) are in the form of  ‘compulsory
purchase’,28 which refers to ‘the compulsory purchase of  any land under powers conferred
by or under any statute’.29 Like the US, ‘right to compensation’ is one of  the core issues in
compulsory purchase and the compensation should be fair and include market value.30 The
question is whether the market value should include ‘any betterment’ which refers to ‘any
increase in the market value of  the retained land attributable to the nature of, or the carrying
out of, the relevant project’.31
International treatises and documents also stress the importance of  regulation on land
development and reasonable constraints on private property. For example, the pivotal
property provision of  the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 proclaims, in
Protocol 1, Article 1, that:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of  his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of  his possessions except in the public
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of  international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of  a
State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of  property
in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of  taxes or other
contributions or penalties’.
The land policy of  the United Nations (UN), first officially articulated at the UN
Conference on Human Settlements (Habitat I) in 1976,32 is along the same lines. The
Preamble of  Agenda Item 10(d) of  the Conference Report says:
Land . . . cannot be treated as an ordinary asset, controlled by individuals and
subject to the pressures and inefficiencies of  the market. Private land ownership
is also a principal instrument of  accumulation and concentration of  wealth and
therefore contributes to social injustice; if  unchecked, it may become a major
obstacle in the planning and implementation of  development schemes. The
provision of  decent dwellings and healthy conditions for the people can only be
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26 Macpherson (n 12) 117.
27 This article concentrates on the law of  England. However, some aspects of  the law on compulsory purchase
apply throughout United Kingdom. 
28 See e.g. T Allen, ‘Controls over the Use and Abuse of  Eminent Domain in England: A Comparative View’ in
R P Malloy (ed), Private Property, Community Development, and Eminent Domain (Ashgate 2008) 75–100. The origin
of  compulsory purchase lies in the Town and Country Planning Act 1947. Other pieces of  major legislation
include the Land Compensation Act 1961, the Compulsory Purchase Act (1965), the Town and Country
Planning Act 1990, Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act (2004). 
29 Law Commission, ‘Towards a Compulsory Purchase Code: (1) Compensation, An Overview’ (Law Com
Consultation Paper No165, 2004) 4.
30 Ibid 6. However, in some cases, market value does not necessarily mean fairness. For example, individuals
bought at the top of  the property market a few years ago, but the market value fell and the individuals are
being compensated for the market value of  the property at today’s prices. These situations are being
condemned to negative equity. Thanks to Professor Gordon Anthony for raising this point. 
31 Law Commission (n 29) 8.
32 Held in Vancouver, Canada, 31 May–11 June 1976. 
achieved if  land is used in the interests of  society as a whole. Public control of
land use is therefore indispensable . . .33
Diverse measures34 of  public control of  land (in particular of  agricultural land on the
periphery of  urban areas) use are listed in Recommendation D2 of  the report. Measures (ii)
and (v) recognise land development rights. Measure (ii) specifies ‘acquisition of
development rights’ along with ‘the creation of  land reserves and land banks’. Measure (v)
emphasises ‘co-ordination between orderly urban development and the promotion and
location of  new developments, preserving agricultural land’.35 Furthermore,
‘Recommendation D.3 recapturing plus value’ provides that ‘the rise in land values resulting
from change in use of  land . . . must be subject to appropriate recapture by public body (the
community)’. Yet it is still difficult to answer the question: should the individual landowner
be left to bear the cost of  a regulatory intervention which endures to the wider benefit of
the whole community? If  we take the liberal concept of  property, then private property
seems to be in constant conflict with public interests and wider social concerns.
Community, situating between the state and the individuals, and community’s relationship
to development rights, have not provoked enough discussion.
The evolution of  the transfer of  land development rights, a process emerging from
zoning and city planning in the US since the 1960s, provides a vehicle not only for
compensating betterment in the taking of  private land for development but also an
alternative for traditional ways of  taking, such as eminent domain. The transfer of
development rights is ‘trading a development restriction on one property for the right to
develop on another’.36 The nature of  the transfer of  development rights is ‘regulatory tools
designed to facilitate land use planning’,37 setting a ‘regulatory cap’38 of  land resources,
usually for purposes of  nature conservation and environmental protection. What are being
transferred in the process are quotas or credits of  land for future development.39
Furthermore, the transfer of  land development rights in the US could be interpreted as
requiring that the state recognises ownership of  land development rights by private owners,
and the state must purchase the development rights from private owners or allow
development rights to be traded freely in market as commodities. In this way, the transfer
of  land development rights could mitigate the harsh consequences associated with eminent
domain and constitute a form of  just compensation.
The most frequently cited of  the many examples of  the transfer of  land development
rights are the New York plan and the Chicago plan.40 New York city began to experiment
with the transfer of  land development rights in 1961. The city restricted the use of  the
property on which historic landmarks are located and the owner may transfer his or her
development rights to another property he or she owns in the receiving area.41 In the New
York plan, the land development right is vested in the same owner but can be transferred
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 64(3)416
33 <http://habitat.igc.org/vancouver/vp-d.htm>.
34 Such measures include zoning and land-use planning, purchase, compensated expropriation and fiscal controls
such as taxation.
35 <http://habitat.igc.org/vancouver/vp-d.htm>.
36 Stinson (n 24) 330.
37 Ibid 324.
38 C Rose, ‘The Several Futures of  Property’ (1998) 83 Minnesota Law Review 129, 164. 
39 See e.g. V Renard, ‘Property Rights and the ‘Transfer of  Development Rights’: Questions of  Efficiency and
Equity’ (2007) 78 (1) TPR 41; A D Ellerman, ‘A Note on Tradeable Permits’ (2005) 31 Environmental and
Resources Economics 123. 
40 M D Strugar, ‘Transferable Development Rights: Robbing Peter to Pay Paul?’ (1985) 62(4) University of
Detroit Law Review 633, 634.
41 Ibid.
to different locations. The Chicago plan resembles the New York plan, but also departs
from it: while restricting the use of  the development of  the plot of  the land where historic
landmarks are located, the city of  Chicago allowed the unused development rights of  that
land to be transferred elsewhere as compensation to the owner.43 Chicago city also set up
a city-run ‘development rights bank’ through which land development rights were bought
and sold. In cases where an owner did not wish to participate directly in the transfer of  land
development rights, the city had to purchase or condemn that preserved site and
compensated the owner with land development rights in the form of  cash from the profits
generated from the bank.44
However, the transfer of  land development rights is more than a form of  compensation
but, in fact, constitutes another form of  taking, that is, the taking of  development rights
rather than ownership. At the same time, the transfer of  land development rights can also
be a form of  giving. For instance, in the US examples, the development rights were taken
away from the landowner in order to preserve the historic sites, but in the meantime value
was given to both the local community (the continued pleasure/amenity of  having a
beautiful building preserved as part of  their neighbourhood) and to wider communities (a
building of  artistic, architectural and historic importance is preserved as part of  the national
or world heritage). Furthermore, two other kinds of  giving also happened in the transfers
of  development rights. First, land owners whose development rights had been taken were
given in exchange the right to develop other land elsewhere (or money in lieu, supplied by
landowners elsewhere who chose to buy the development rights from him/her). Secondly,
the local community in the ‘receiving area’ was given local benefits provided by the enabled
development in the receiving area and the wider community was given the benefits of  a
planned environment.45
In order for the giving to happen, the practice of  transfers needs to integrate the
‘communal dimension’, that is, reconciling individualistic and exclusive ownership with
communal interests and participation. This communal dimension is crucial for a successful
transfer programme. Voluntary participation and public confidence in the value of
transferred land development rights are particularly important.46 For example, in order to
avoid the situation that a biased regulation burdens one participant (whether the property
owners or property developers) in a transfer programme, a comprehensive zoning plan
needs to be drafted so that ‘reciprocity of  advantage’ and ‘consensus’ can be achieved in
order to ‘benefit the entire community’ and to ‘maximise the efficient use of  community
resource and to minimise the deleterious consequence of  development’.47 This calls for
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42 Platt (n 18) 272. 
43 Ibid 635.
44 Ibid.
45 Thanks to Professor Alison Clarke for raising this point. 
46 Stinson (n 24) 346.
47 Stinson (n 24) 349–51.
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Figure 1. Transfers of development rights42
various participation and support from both the sending and receiving areas in order to
strike the balance between overprotection of  individual rights and state coercion.48 The
next section explores this issue further through two case studies of  the transfer of  land
development rights in China.
The transfer of land development rights in China
LegAL FrAmeWork For LANd ACQuISITIoN ANd The urBAN–rurAL dIvIde
It may be useful to contextualise our central concerns by looking briefly at the Chinese legal
system. Law-making in China is guided by a so-called principle that ‘broad legislation is
always better than detailed’. National law only provides general principles and needs to be
complemented by various kinds of  regulations for implementation. As a result, there exists
a complex hierarchy of  law-making power and legislative organs. Specifically, according to
the Legislation Law of  the People’s Republic of  China 2000, the National People’s Congress
and Standing Committee exercise state legislative power (Article 7). And only national laws
may be enacted in respect of  matters relating to ‘acquisition of  non-state assets’
(Article 8(6)). The State Council enacts administrative regulations in accordance with the
Constitution and national law in order to implement national law (Article 56). Various
ministries and commissions under the State Council also exercise regulatory power and
make administrative rules in accordance with national law, administrative regulations, and
decisions and orders of  the State Council in order to implement administrative regulations
(Article 71). Local People’s Congresses and Standing Committees make local decrees and
local governments make local rules within their authorities (Articles 68, 71). In theory, the
Constitution has the highest authority, followed by administrative regulations, which have
higher authority than local decrees and administrative or local rules (Article 79). In reality,
appropriation of  land resources is often decided by different forms of  regulation.
Moreover, land acquisition is often empowered by local rules, which often contradict
national law, leading to disputes and conflicts between local government and the people.
China’s land system is underpinned by the urban–rural divide, an entrenched feature of
the Maoist era (1949–1976). This divide generated and continues to generate inequality
between rural and urban development in many respects, including social security,
infrastructure investment, education and health care. Post-Mao, and especially in the post-
Deng period (1992–present), legal and administrative distinctions between urban and rural
become blurred.49 Yet the land system remains an obstacle for bridging the urban–rural gap.
Although equal protection of  state, collective and private property is one of  the important
principles of  Property Law 2007(Article 4), two kinds of  unequal ownership exist in the
contemporary Chinese land system.50 Urban land is owned by the state, which can grant
and allocate land-use rights, and local governments therefore can transfer these land-use
rights. By contrast, while in law rural land is collectively owned, what constitutes ‘the
collectives’ is ill-defined. The de facto owners are often local governmental authorities such
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 64(3)
48 It is quite likely that a receiving area is too distant from the sending (preserving) area, and what is being
protected in the sending area is hardly to be realised: see ibid 349. 
49 Decollectivisation in 1978 loosened the control over the rural population on leaving the countryside, and
urbanisation and rural industrialisation make the urban–rural boundaries blurred. The blurred boundaries are
demonstrated in e.g. rural–urban migration and the rapid urban expansion. 
50 A tri-ownership system, including state ownership, collective ownership and private ownership, has evolved
and persisted. Property Law 2007 provides equal protection for public property and private property for the
first time since 1949, but there is much debate over whether private property should be given the same status
as public property. Furthermore, in contrast to the official, and indeed legal, support for unitary and exclusive
property rights, the reality of  the property regime has seen fragmentation of  property rights in which de facto
owners are multiple.
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as administrative villages and the township-level government. Farmers may not in law
dispose of  their land freely and are vulnerable to compulsory land acquisition by the state.51
In the process of  urbanisation and industrialisation, rural land is generating significant
profits; however, local governments, officials and property developers are enjoying these
profits, while farmers are often excluded and sometimes exploited. Land acquisition is a
typical example.
Land acquisition is the only way for farmers’ land-use rights to enter into the market.
Both the Chinese Constitution52 and the Land Administration Law53 specify that the state,
in the public interest,54 may lawfully acquire land owned by collectives. This sets the
mechanism for compulsory land acquisition. The Land Administration Law states that
compensation shall be given in accordance with the original use of  the acquired land,55 and
the compensation is through a package that includes compensation for the land,
resettlement subsidies and compensation for fixtures to, and young or green crops on, the
acquired land. Article 42 of  Property Law 2007 expands the scope of  compensation to ‘the
premiums for social security of  the farmers’ in order to guarantee their normal lives and
safeguard their lawful rights and interests. However, the compensation is still not specified
to be paid at full market prices, not to mention the recognition of  development rights.
Indeed, without taking account of  either the market value of  the land and the land
development rights, local governments can acquire rural land from farmers at a low price
(e.g. RMB30,000–50,000 RMB/mu,56 equivalent to US$321–535/hectare) and sell it to
property developers at a high price (e.g. millions of  RMB/mu). A great profit thus could be
made because of  the huge gap between these two different prices.
ChINA’S LANd poLICy
China needs to feed 1.3 billion people but arable land only constituted 13 per cent of  the
total land in 1996 and this figure decreased to 11.8 per cent in 2009.57 Preserving 1.8 billion
mu of  arable land in order to ensure the country’s food supply is a national policy. Guided
by this policy, the Land Administration Law was revised in 1998 in order to exert strict
control over the use of  arable land. The central government has also formulated a master
plan for land utilisation, which classifies the purposes of  land use into agricultural use,
construction use and unused. Land development must be in accord with the master plan,58
and property developers need to apply for ‘agricultural use land conversion quotas’ (that is,
the quotas that land for agricultural use can be converted to construction uses) set out in
the master and annual plans.59
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51 For more discussion, see T Xu, ‘The End of  the Urban–Rural Divide? Emerging Quasi Commons in Rural
China’ (2010) 96(4) Archiv für Rechts und Sozialphilosophie (the Archives for Philosophy of  Law and Social
Philosophy) 557. 
52 Constitution 2004, Article 10(3).
53 Land Administration Law 2004, Article 2(4) 
54 In China, the definition of  public interest is at the discretion of  the government in particular local
governments. Many lavish commercial and industrial projects have been built in the name of  public interest.
For a recent review of  the notion of  public interest in a global context, see J Morison and G Anthony, ‘The
Place of  Public Interest’ in G Anthony et al (eds), Values in Global Administrative Law (Hart Publishing 2011)
215–38. 
55 Land Administration Law 2004, Article 47
56 1 hectare=15 mu. 
57 <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/AG.LND.ARBL.ZS/countries> accessed 15 January 2013.
58 Article 23 of  the Regulations on the Implementation of  the Land Administration Law 1998, promulgated by
the State Council on 27 December 1998; implemented on 1 January 1999. 
59 See Article 19 of  the Regulations on the Implementation of  the Land Administration Law 1998, promulgated
by the State Council on 27 December 1998; implemented on 1 January 1999. 
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Yet ‘agricultural use land conversion quotas’ set out in the land-use plans cannot always
meet the need of  land for development projects in the context of  rapid economic growth
and urbanisation. Furthermore, by the end of  2004, rural-to-urban migration left 4 million
mu of  land idle, populated only by low-density and abandoned farmers’ residential plots. The
State Council responded with a policy on ‘consolidation of  rural construction land’ in 2004,
encouraging farmers to consolidate their abandoned residential plots or to move into high-
density residential blocks.60 Then the land of  their old residential plots could be converted
to arable land, which means that construction land in rural areas may decrease subsequently,
creating quotas for construction land in urban areas. A balance between the increase in urban
construction land and the decrease in rural construction land could be achieved.
The TrANSFer oF LANd deveLopmeNT rIghTS IN WugANg61
Wugang city (county level) is located in Henan province, central China. The city has 190
administrative villages (xingzheng cun) and 834 natural villages (ziran cun)62 with a population
of  approximately 320,000. The city houses one of  China’s biggest iron and steel companies.
A lake that runs through the city with beautiful mountains surrounding it has made Wugang
a popular tourist destination in recent years.
The experiment with the transfer of  land development rights in Wugang is made
possible by a larger rural reform project  – ‘merging villages into planned neighbourhoods’,
colloquially referred to the measure of  ‘linking up the increase in urban construction land
and the decrease in rural construction land’ discussed above. In 2005, the Ministry of  Land
and Resources issued a proposal to standardise this measure and began the experiment with
‘merging villages into planned neighbourhoods’ in five provinces including Shandong,
Jiangsu, Hubei, Sichuan and Tianjin in 2006.63 The experiment has expanded on a
nationwide scale since 2009. As a pilot city for this experiment in Henan province, Wugang
has begun to relocate farmers to condensed residential places such as newly built flats in
residential blocks in the rural area. New planned neighbourhoods have been formed.
Farmers have also been offered houses and flats cheaper than the market price and
subsidies and loans without interest for house purchase. Land previously used for rural
residence, unused land, and land abandoned by villagers who have moved to the cities as
rural migrant workers has been converted into farmland. The conversion created extra
quotas (land development rights) for construction land, which could be transferred to and
used in developing cities and towns. Overall, the amount of  construction land has not
increased and the amount of  arable land has not decreased.
The city government aims to merge 834 villages into four towns and 17 planned
neighbourhoods. There are nine planned neighbourhoods under construction to be finished
by 2015. So far 27,000 mu (1800 hectare) of  land has been made available for urban
construction.64 New neighbourhoods have been constructed according to their local
advantages in industry, trade or service. In those neighbourhoods close to industrial areas,
farmers could get new jobs in the factories. For example, Shangcao community at Tieshan
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60 ‘Decision on Land Administration Reform’, No 28 (2004), State Council.
61 The empirical material is gathered from both authors’ fieldwork in Wugang, China in August 2011. We
interviewed local officials and farmers who participated in the transfer of  land development rights. 
62 ‘Natural villages’ emphasises villages ‘in the sense of  what is local and long-standing’, while ‘administrative
villages’ refers to ‘the collective’ or ‘sub-government institutions’. See S Feuchtwang, ‘What is Village?’ in 
E B Vermeer et al (eds), Cooperative and Collective in China’s Rural Development: Between State and Private Interests
(M E Sharpe 1998) 47. 
63 ‘The measure of  linking up the increase in urban construction land and the decrease in rural construction land’
(Ministry of  Land and Resources 2005) 
64 Data collected from interviews with local officials. 
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town is close to a shoe factory which employs more than 6000 workers. These
neighbourhoods also provide many opportunities for farmers to engage in trade or service.
For example, Zhangzhuang community of  Yinji town is a tourist destination located in a
beautiful area of  reservoir basin. Farmers often live in newly built two-level houses. They
live on the ground floor and the first floor is used as bed and breakfast accommodation.
Yinji town is also a production centre for traditional Chinese medicine, providing many job
opportunities for local farmers. Farmers have formed new networks of  social relations
based on common commercial interests and professional specialisations, that is,
‘instrumental (economic) community’.
The TrANSFer oF LANd deveLopmeNT rIghTS IN ChoNgQINg: LANd TICkeTS TrANSFer66
Chongqing is a major city in southwest China and one of  the four directly controlled
municipalities by the central government. It is the largest municipality located in inland
China, comprising 19 districts and 21 counties.67 As one of  the fastest urbanising cities in
China, by the end of  2010, Chongqing’s urban resident population had reached 15.29
million which constituted 53 per cent of  the total 33.03 million population.68
Chongqing was chosen by the National Development and Reform Commission as an
‘experimental zone for comprehensive integration of  urban and rural development’ in June
2007. As part of  the experiment, in 2008, Chongqing set up a Rural Land Exchange Centre,
a division of  Chongqing Bureau of  Land and Resources, in which land tickets (dipiao, land
quotas or credits), equivalent to land development rights, can be traded. The processes
usually include: rural land in remote areas (usually abandoned land by farmers who have
migrated to cities or new land made available through ‘merging villages into planned
neighbourhoods’) is reclaimed and converted into new farmland; the increase of  farmland
and the subsequent decrease of  rural construction land generate new quotas for urban land
that could be used for construction purposes; the Rural Land Exchange Centre combines
separate quotas generated by consolidation of  small pieces of  land (e.g. 0.3 mu of
construction land generated from one small piece of  land) into a large bundle (e.g. hundreds
of  mu of  construction land), which constitutes a land ticket; land tickets are then sold to
various kinds of  property investors and developers including the Urban Development
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65 This model is based on Platt’s (n 18) Figure 1. 
66 Empirical material is gathered from the second-named author’s fieldwork in Chongqing, China in March 2012.
The author interviewed local officials especially those in the Rural Land Exchange Centre and farmers. 
67 Chongqing Survey Yearbook 2011 (China Statistics Press 2011) 4.
68 Ibid 3.
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Figure 2: The transfer of land development rights in Wugang, China65
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Investment Companies,69 state-owned enterprises, private enterprises or property
developers through auctions at the Rural Land Exchange Centre; finally, the Rural Land
Exchange Centre distributes the income from selling the land tickets to farmers whose
residential plots have been converted into farmland for making new quotas for construction
land. As farmers (strictly speaking, the households) only hold land-use rights and village
committees ‘own’ rural land ownership, farmers are entitled to around 85 per cent of  the
income and the village committee is entitled to around 15 per cent of  the income.
Distribution of  income among farmers is according to each household’s contribution to
generating one land ticket. However, acquiring land quotas does not mean gaining real land.
Companies which have successfully acquired land quotas only have entitlements to using
land for urban development. They still need to go through the processes of  bid and auction
held by another division of  the Bureau of  Land and Resources in order to buy land use
rights for construction purposes. Developers must also ensure that redevelopment of  the
land is in accordance with city land planning. Furthermore, there is no second-level market
for trading land development rights.
Eleven auctions held by May 2010 at the Exchange Centre have raised land quotas
amounting to 1200 hectares (18,000 mu) of  land, equivalent to 1.9 billion yuan. Official
policy makes it clear that profits generated in the trade of  land tickets shall be reinvested in
agricultural and rural development as well as spent as compensation to villages and farmers
for housing demolition and as subsidies for building new houses. The exchange of  land
tickets has enabled profits generated from the process of  urbanisation and the expansion
of  the urban land market to trickle down into the hands of  farmers. It also created
possibilities for a unified urban and rural land market.
WugANg ANd ChoNgQINg eXperImeNTS CompAred
In Wugang, the measure of  linking up the increase in urban construction land and the
decrease in rural construction land can only be applied within the administrative jurisdiction
at the country level. To put it another way, land development rights (quotas) generated for
construction use can only be used in the same area where rural land has been consolidated.
So, the sending area and receiving area are within the same locality or at least close enough.
The disadvantage of  this restriction may be that the compensation standard is often set very
low, because the land development rights are usually transferred to newly built
neighbourhoods or towns close to the sending area. Although subsidies and loans are
provided for farmers, the compensation does not amount to market values of  the acquired
land. Yet, since the receiving area is close to the sending area, the rural area has gained
Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 64(3)
69 The Urban Development Investment Companies act as land development agents for local government. 
70 This model is based on Platt’s (n 18) Figure 1
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Figure 3: The transfer of land development rights in Chongqing70
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opportunities for development, while arable land could still be preserved, both constitute
important kinds of  giving. The Wugang experiment also stresses the importance of
community in the process of  development. Although the construction of  planned
neighbourhoods is mainly led by the government and driven by economic motivation, it has
considered ‘non-economic’ components of  economic networks71 that farmers could keep
emotional or sentimental attachment to the rural land, while enjoying developmental
opportunities as members of  the newly formed community.
In Chongqing, administrative boundaries may be crossed through the exchange of  land
tickets. Land tickets raised in the remote rural areas are traded together with land tickets
raised in the suburban areas of  Chongqing with the same price through auctions and bids.
Therefore one of  the advantages of  this experiment is that farmers in the remote area could
get a relatively high level of  compensation. However, as the receiving area is too distant
from the sending area, real development is concentrated on cities and their peripheries,
which may enlarge the gap between the rural and the urban areas. Furthermore, most
successful bidders of  land tickets are the Urban Development Investment Companies,
commercial property developers and manufacturing enterprises. Before acquiring land
tickets, they usually have a considerable amount of  land already reserved in hand but not
yet within city planning and thus not ready for development. Getting land tickets
‘legitimises’ the use of  their already reserved land but may create monopolies of  land.
Moreover, these bidders have often cultivated ‘under-the-table’ relationships with the local
government and among themselves, which help them to lower the prices in the bidding
processes. Unlike the transfer of  land development rights in the US, which may mitigate the
harsh consequences of  takings of  land ownership, the transfer of  land development rights
in Chongqing actually creates more quotas for ‘takings’ of  rural land ownership. Problems
are also centred on: how to allocate land transfer income; how to avoid excessive
involvement of  local governments; and how to make sure that farmers participate in the
transfer of  development rights voluntarily?
Conclusion: taking as giving, appropriation as access through the community lens
What constitutes community? Is it only limited to the sense of  geographical entities? What
is the relationship between community and law? We have briefly outlined Cotterrell’s ‘law-
in-community’ approach in the introduction, and this approach is not without criticism.
Simon Roberts, for example, argues that:
[Cotterrell] proposes that state law should reach out to co-ordinate and facilitate
the operation of  plural legal orders at the level of  ‘community’. Some of  these
accounts tell a story of  the covert expansion of  state power, and of  increased
opportunities for coercion and manipulation.72
However, Cotterrell does not intend to prescribe, but offers a method to observe and
explain the penetration of  state power into the private sphere in the form of  regulation,
which now seems an irreversible trend. Furthermore, it is often easy to label Cotterrell’s
approach as an ‘ideal-type’ Western theory. However, the approach is in nature a
methodology, and is not characteristically Western.73 In fact, the community lens proposed
by Cotterrell is a useful method that could be applied to the Chinese context. Take the
Wugang experiment, for example: community is never a static entity. Farmers keep moving
out of  the villages and forming new kinds of  community, transforming old networks of
social relations and creating new ones. In the transfer of  land development rights in
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Wugang, the sending and receiving areas are dynamic networks of  social relations rather
than static geographical entities. Some effective aspects of  the regulation strengthen and
facilitate trust, co-operation, and reciprocity of  benefits among different actors of
community (for example, farmers, local governments and private developers). Furthermore,
although there are always clashes and overlaps between different networks of  social
relations, one network of  community is often dominated by one type of  social relations. For
example, the newly formed community in Wugang is dominated by instrumental social
relations that engage with market activities and share the benefits of  urban development.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the old social relations have disappeared or regulation
should not take the old social relations into account. In Wugang, while being located to new
neighbourhoods, farmers still keep emotional attachment to the farmland and tradition and
custom are not entirely abandoned, due in part to the arrangement that the receiving area
is close to the sending area.
The community lens also sheds light on rethinking the relationship of  legal
appropriation and development. As Radin argues, a system of  property holding needs to be
justified by community participation.74 Krueckeberg also points out that ‘rights to personal
use of  property are fundamental to individual and social well-being; rights to profit from
property, in contrast, have always been subject to reasonable constraints for the benefit of
the entire community and the society’.75 Property is social relations, encompassing
entitlements and obligations. Property law governs ‘the contours of  social relations’.76 The
community lens helps to look at diverse communal relations existing between individual
autonomy and state control, offering opportunities to explore plural property regimes.
Stressing the community lens is important to avoid the limits of  public/private dualism and
to reconcile the tensions between private property and public regulation.
Taking, appropriation of  private land for public use, often points to a right of  exclusion.
However, in our evaluation of  Wugang’s experiment with the transfer of  land development
rights, the community lens helps to show the possibility of  appropriation as right of  access.
Although farmers’ land development rights were taken for purposes of  preserving arable
land, new networks of  social relations were formed based on farmers’ common economic
interests and professional specialisations through which they were able to access alterative
development opportunities (‘participatory development’) in newly formed neighbourhoods.
In this context, appropriation, being read through the community lens, is not just about the
right to exclude but also the right to access, and taking could also be giving. Stressing the
community lens provides a useful vehicle to rethink not only the practice of  the transfer of
land development rights but also the relationship between legal appropriation and
development. Law will often face the dilemma that law steals or is stolen by development,
unless law recognises the importance of  networks of  social relations. This is not simply
recognising that the capital gain by urban development should return – at least the large part
of  it – to the community. More importantly, law needs to engage with different networks of
social relations, strengthen trust and co-operation among different actors in relation of
community. Finally, as the networks of  social relations transcends the boundaries of  the
nation state, cutting across the local and the globe, the community lens would also be useful
for analysing law and development issues on a global scale. And this will be the subject of
another paper.
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75 Krueckeberg (n 19) 307. 
76 J W Singer, Entitlement: The Paradoxes of  Property (Yale University Press) 61. 
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